EU competition law is supposed to keep pace with increasingly dynamic and fast‑moving markets. As enforcement is getting more complex, proceedings tend to drag on for years. At the same time, the practical effectiveness of traditional remedies has come under renewed scrutiny. Recent developments – including the long-awaited end of the Intel saga – might offer a timely opportunity to reassess whether existing tools, in particular interim measures, are fit for purpose. Can they keep up the pace?
End of the Intel Marathon: What actually matters
On 10 December 2025, the European General Court (GC) brought the long-overdue end to the so-called Intel saga.
The story began more than twenty years ago (at a time when microprocessors were nothing more than a choking hazard to the author) with a complaint from competitor AMD about Intel’s rebate schemes. Since then, the case has generated enough ink (and blog posts) to sink a data centre, particularly on so-called ‘naked restrictions’ (= abusive conduct in the form of direct payments to computer manufacturers to halt or delay the launch of computers containing AMD processors), rebates and the burden of proof. I will therefore focus on just a few key points from the most recent judgment:
- No need to re-prove what is already settled. The European Commission did not need to re-establish its jurisdiction or an infringement of antitrust law for the naked restrictions. The previous court decisions are legally binding in this regard.
- New facts, not new theories, trigger a new SO. Where a Commission decision has only been partially annulled by the courts, the Commission is obliged to issue a new statement of objections and, if necessary, organize a new hearing only if new facts are presented. Changes in the legal assessment alone do not require the Commission to issue a new statement of objections.
- Delay does not automatically reduce the fine. The fine was reduced from approx. EUR 376 million to approx. EUR 237 million as the GC found that the temporal scope and material gravity of the remaining infringement had been overstated in relation to the original statement of objections in 2009. The GC nevertheless emphasized that the length of the proceedings by itself does not require the Commission to reduce the fine. Any damage caused by a delay must be claimed in a separate action for damages.
Slow and steady wins the race?
One obvious takeaway, apart from the fact that it can be worth challenging Commission and court decisions (as already discussed in this post), is that antitrust proceedings can take a (very) long time. This is not groundbreaking news though.
A study commissioned by the Commission from March 2025 on the implementation and effectiveness of antitrust remedies examined all 108 non-cartel antitrust decisions adopted up to that point in time under the current procedural framework, Regulation 1/2003. The findings on duration were sobering:
The average duration of prohibition proceedings (under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003) was found to be 45 months, and 26 months for proceedings that ended with commitments by the parties (under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003). Article 7 decisions primarily contain an immediate cease-and-desist order regarding the anticompetitive conduct and rarely, if necessary, remedies to ensure compliance. In contrast, Article 9 proceedings do not formally establish an infringement, but rather oblige the addressee to commit to certain measures designed to address the authority’s concerns.
Excessively long proceedings carry the risk of rendering remedies ineffective. In fast-moving (particularly digital) markets, a final infringement decision adopted after several years may come too late to hinder irreparable damage to competition, and remedies may not be as flexible as the evolving market environment demands. At the same time, it is important to ensure a due process and diligent consideration of all necessary facts.
Is there a shortcut?
One of the study’s recommendations to speed up proceedings and address fast-moving markets is to make greater use of interim measures (under Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003). Interim measures are temporary behavioural remedies. Examples include prohibiting predatory pricing, ordering a dominant undertaking to resume supply, granting access to a facility, or requiring the licensing of intellectual property rights – all on a provisional basis pending the final decision.
Two cumulative conditions must be met:
- A prima facie finding of an infringement of antitrust law; and
- urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition.
Since even provisional measures can have a significant impact on the addressee’s business and are based only on a prima facie assessment, particularly high standards must be applied.
Since the “cartel regulation” 1/2003 came into force in 2003, the Commission has only adopted interim measures in a single case, in 2019 (Broadcom).
Given the upcoming revision of Regulation 1/2003 (which is expected in Q3 2026), it is only logical that the requirements for adopting interim measures are under scrutiny. The debate centres on whether the current legal requirements strike the right balance between enabling timely intervention and safeguarding against premature enforcement. Some argue that the requirements for interim measures are too demanding and, in practice, prevent their use. Others, however, are of the opinion that the requirements are appropriately calibrated, and that, given the exceptional and intrusive nature of interim measures, any lower requirements may lead to overregulation and far-reaching false positives based on incomplete facts.
Lower requirements = more interim measures?
Even if one takes the position that the current legal test is too strict, it is far from clear that lowering the requirements would actually lead to increased use of interim measures. In Germany, for example, the implementation of lower requirements for the adoption of interim measures in 2021 (Section 32a (1) of the German Act Against Restraints on Competition) had no impact on the number of cases.
In addition, interim measure-proceedings also take a certain amount of time. They are faster than full infringement decision, but they do not offer an immediate remedy. And the commitment procedure under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 offers a flexible and relatively swift way to address antitrust concerns in practice. For both the Commission and companies, commitments can be more appealing than contested interim measures.
Outlook
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether, and if so to what extent, the requirements for interim measures will be revisited in the update of Regulation 1/2003 and whether this will lead to an increase in the number of cases involving interim measures. Meanwhile, the Commission’s work on guidelines on exclusionary abuses, which are expected to move away from an effects-based approach towards a greater reliance on legal presumptions in enforcement practice, could significantly impact the duration of abuse of dominant proceedings anyway.
Photo by Alex Kubsch on Unsplash
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