Mustafa AYNA, Selim TURAN, Yavuz YILDIZ, Ceren ÖZER, ACTECON
Leniency is not a “file-and-forget” exercise. For companies considering whether to approach the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA or the Authority), the real test starts after the leniency application is filed. The TCA’s decision (the Decision) concerning the hybrid fruit and vegetable seed sector makes that point forcefully. Beyond its findings on price-fixing and the exchange of competitively sensitive information, the Decision is particularly interesting for what it says about conditional immunity, post-application conduct and the overlap between leniency and settlement.
What Happened?
The investigation originated in a leniency application submitted by Nunhems Tohumculuk AŞ (Nunhems) on 10 May 2024 following an internal review of employees’ computers and mobile phones. Nunhems disclosed evidence of two horizontal infringements of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (Competition Law) namely (i) a price-fixing arrangement concerning hybrid industrial gherkin seeds and (ii) a broader exchange of competitively sensitive information.
The subsequent investigation covered 16 undertakings active in the hybrid fruit and vegetable seed sector. Twelve undertakings ultimately settled with the TCA. The remaining four parties (Antalya Tarım, Gautier, Metgen and Tasfiye Halinde AD Rossen (in Liquidation)) did not settle, and the TCA issued infringement findings and fines against them for exchanging competitively sensitive information. Nunhems was granted full immunity for both infringements at the outset; however, that immunity was subsequently withdrawn regarding the information exchange, while remaining in place for the price-fixing infringement.
The underlying conduct shows how quickly “routine” competitor contacts can become an antitrust problem. In the gherkin seed market, competing sales personnel exchanged customer-specific prices, stock and collection information and coordinated responses to resellers perceived as “disrupting the market”. More broadly, the investigation uncovered exchanges of current and prospective price lists, discounts, sales volumes, market shares and other commercially sensitive information, including through WhatsApp. In other words: The usual suspects, in the usual channels, with very real consequences.
Leniency is a continuing obligation – not a one-off reward
A particularly noteworthy aspect of the Decision is the withdrawal of immunity that had already been granted. Nunhems’ initial application was sufficient to secure full immunity for both infringements. Nevertheless, on 3 July 2025 the TCA withdrew that immunity in respect of the information exchange, on the ground that Nunhems had not satisfied the condition set out in Article 6(1)(c) of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels (Leniency Regulation), which requires an applicant to bring an end to its participation in the reported cartel unless the case handlers indicate otherwise on the basis that doing so would hinder detection of the cartel.
The message is straightforward: Immunity does not crystallize on the filing date. It remains conditional. The applicant’s obligations continue throughout the investigation. In particular, the obligation to cease the disclosed conduct immediately is not a box to be ticked at the moment of the application; it remains a live compliance obligation until the TCA reaches its final decision.
This has an important practical implication. The filing of a leniency application should be the start of the clean-up, not the end of it. Once an undertaking approaches the Authority, it must ensure that the disclosed conduct has genuinely ceased and that appropriate safeguards are maintained throughout the investigation. Internal monitoring should therefore continue after filing, especially where the same employees, customers, resellers or WhatsApp groups remain part of the commercial reality.
The Nunhems decision nevertheless illustrates that immunity may cease to protect particular conduct where the applicant fails to comply with its continuing cooperation obligations. Although Nunhems was initially granted immunity for both infringements, the TCA subsequently withdrew immunity only in respect of the exchange of competitively sensitive information, while immunity remained in place for the price-fixing infringement. Nunhems therefore pursued settlement in relation to the information-exchange infringement, and the TCA’s final settlement decision imposed a reduced fine of TRY 10,318,489.92 (approx. EUR 195,093.40) on Nunhems, calculated on its 2024 gross revenue.
A Different Path: Bayer’s Later Application
The Decision also provides a useful counterpoint through Bayer’s subsequent leniency application. Bayer applied on 4 October 2024, while the preliminary investigation was still ongoing, and provided additional documents and information identifying undertakings that had not previously been identified in the file. The TCA accepted that this information constituted evidence of added value and granted Bayer a reduction under the Leniency Regulation. Bayer also benefited from the settlement mechanism on top of the reduction granted within the scope of its leniency application, resulting in a substantial overall reduction in its fine.
The contrasting treatment of Nunhems and Bayer highlights an important feature of the Turkish leniency regime showing that the value of cooperation is not determined solely by who files first. A later applicant may still obtain a meaningful reduction where its submission materially advances the investigation. Conversely, the first applicant may still lose the benefit of immunity if it fails to live up to the continuing obligations attached to leniency.
Taken together, the two cases suggest that the leniency framework rewards both timely disclosure and sustained, substantive cooperation. The former may determine access to immunity or a reduction while the latter may determine whether that benefit survives the investigation.
The Role of Publicly Available Market Information
The Decision is also noteworthy for addressing the market conditions that may have contributed to the exchange of competitively sensitive information. The TCA observed that difficulties in accessing reliable market data had facilitated information exchanges and resolved to send an opinion to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry recommending the publication of historical production, import and export data in an aggregated and anonymised form.
This aspect of the Decision draws an important distinction between a legitimate need for market intelligence and the unlawful means by which competitors may attempt to obtain it. The TCA’s approach suggests that the appropriate solution to information gaps is not bilateral exchange of current or undertaking-specific strategic data, but the availability of independent, aggregated and anonymised market information.
Takeaway
The Nunhems Decision matters not simply because it concerns a cartel in the hybrid seed sector. It matters because it confirms a harder-edged view of leniency: Cooperation must be sustained, not just announced. It also fits a broader trend. Recent practice suggests that the Board has become increasingly willing to make active use of the leniency regime, with a noticeable increase in decisions applying the Leniency Regulation over the past year.
Three points stand out. First, immunity can be lost. A company that self-reports must continue to comply with the conditions of the regime throughout the investigation, including by effectively ending the relevant conduct. Second, late cooperation can still pay off. Bayer’s experience shows that added-value evidence, particularly when combined with settlement, may still lead to meaningful reductions. Third, leniency is becoming more central to TCA enforcement. That should change the risk calculus for companies: Competitors may self-report, and internal red flags – whether identified through an audit, a whistleblower report or a review of employee communications — should be treated as a prompt to assess quickly, and with legal advice, whether leniency is on the table.
Mustafa Ayna
Mustafa Ayna is counsel at ACTECON, based in Istanbul. He primarily advises on competition law, regulatory and anti-dumping matters, and also assists clients with day-to-day competition law advisory work. Mustafa holds an LL.B. from Istanbul Bilgi University, where his studies were funded by a merit-based scholarship. He is fluent in English.
Selim Turan
Selim Turan is a senior associate at ACTECON, based in Istanbul. He advises Turkish and multinational companies on competition law, international trade and regulatory matters. His practice focuses particularly on investigations initiated by the Turkish Competition Authority and merger control proceedings. He also assists clients with trade defence matters, including anti-dumping investigations initiated by the Turkish Ministry of Trade. Selim is fluent in English.
Yavuz Yıldız
Yavuz Yıldız is an associate at ACTECON, based in the firm’s Istanbul office. He advises a broad range of domestic and international clients on competition law matters. His practice includes preliminary and full-fledged investigations initiated by the Turkish Competition Authority, day-to-day competition and regulatory compliance matters, administrative proceedings and merger control matters. Yavuz is fluent in English.
Ceren Özer
Ceren Özer is an associate at ACTECON, based in the firm’s Istanbul office. She advises clients on competition law matters. Prior to joining ACTECON, she was a research intern at Droit, Religion, Entreprise et Société in Strasbourg. She holds a law degree from Galatasaray University and is fluent in English and French.
