
I have to admit that I am a frequent PayPal user. It is simply convenient, particularly when shopping at an online store I am unlikely to visit again: A few clicks, no need to create an account or dig out my credit card details, and I am done. So when the Bundeskartellamt (FCO) issued a press release regarding its preliminary assessment of the PayPal case, it immediately caught my attention. At first sight, a rule preventing merchants from charging customers extra for using PayPal sounds rather consumer-friendly. No hidden fees, no unpleasant surprises at checkout. What is there not to like? Perhaps quite a lot, according to the FCO.
What is the case about?
The proceedings concern PayPal’s terms and conditions, which since 2018 have prohibited merchants from charging customers extra for paying with PayPal. According to the FCO, this means that merchants cannot pass on the additional costs of using PayPal, even where PayPal is more expensive for them than other payment methods.
The FCO’s preliminary assessment is that this no-surcharge rule infringes both the cartel prohibition and the rules on abuse of dominance. The proceedings are ongoing, and PayPal has rejected the regulator’s preliminary assessment.
This raises an interesting question: Can a rule designed to shield consumers from additional fees actually restrict price competition?
Free for consumers, expensive for merchants?
The FCO’s theory of harm is relatively straightforward: According to the regulator, PayPal charges merchants above-average fees compared with other payment methods and has a very high market share in Germany. But because merchants are prohibited from passing these costs on to consumers who use PayPal, they cannot make such cost differences visible to consumers through different prices. In the view of the FCO, this matters because consumers have little reason to care about the costs that different payment methods impose on merchants if those costs are ultimately not reflected in their personal retail price.
According to the FCO, if PayPal allowed merchants to pass the additional costs on to consumers choosing PayPal, those customers might have an incentive to consider alternative payment methods. This, in turn, could increase competitive pressure on PayPal to lower its merchant fees.
Sounds familiar?
Competition lawyers may see some resemblance to the long-running debate (see, e.g., our blogs here and here) around most-favoured-nation clauses (MFNs). But the analogy only goes so far. MFNs typically restrict the price of the underlying product or service across competing distribution channels. A hotel, for example, may have been prevented by an MFN from offering the same room more cheaply on another platform or through its own website.
PayPal’s no-surcharge rule operates differently. PayPal does not tell merchants what to charge for the product itself. Rather, it prevents the merchant from adding a separate charge reflecting the cost of using PayPal. However, both restrictions can prevent differences in the costs of competing intermediaries from becoming visible in the price a consumer sees.
But is allowing the surcharge really the answer?
There is, of course, another side to the story. Consumers, myself included, generally do not like surcharges. Transparent and uniform checkout prices have obvious benefits, including making it easier to compare the prices of the underlying products. Merchants, too, may prefer a simple checkout process rather than confronting customers with an additional layer of pricing complexity at the very last step.
More importantly, the FCO’s theory appears to depend on how consumers would actually respond to surcharges. The logic of the FCO is as follows: No surcharge → less switching → less competition between payment methods → higher merchant fees. But the strength of each link in that chain matters. If consumers strongly prefer PayPal because of its convenience, familiarity, buyer protection or other features, would a relatively small surcharge really cause them to switch?
This is ultimately an empirical question. If only a few consumers would change payment methods to save a few cents, allowing surcharges might make payment costs more transparent without materially increasing competitive pressure on PayPal. The willingness of consumers to switch the payment provider depending on costs may therefore be central to whether the FCO’s theory of harm works in practice.
So where does this take us?
So, does “no surcharge” come at a price? At first sight, not for consumers. But critics might point out that merchants will ultimately pass PayPal’s higher costs on to consumers which might lead to higher product prices. Given that surcharges are prohibited by law for certain other payment methods, such as consumer credit card payments, SEPA credit transfers and direct debits, the case raises the interesting question of whether, and to what extent, a dominant undertaking may infringe competition law by “merely” mirroring statutory requirements applicable to other market players.
Ultimately, the FCO will have to determine what PayPal’s terms do (or did) to competition, and consumer prices, over time. Do seemingly consumer-friendly terms effectively shield PayPal from competition by allegedly cheaper payment providers? Do they coerce merchants into paying unnecessarily high fees? The FCO’s final assessment will definitely be worth watching, as will the potential consequences for PayPal, including monetary sanctions – according to the press release the FCO is also considering a disgorgement of economic benefits obtained. Sometimes, “no surcharge” may come at a price after all.
Photo by Erik Mclean on Unsplash
